Nathan D. Gibson
Publications
Gibson, Nathan D. 2026. “A Theory of Presidential Centralization with Politicization” Journal of Theoretical Politics 38(2): 110-132.
Cameron, Charles M., and Nathan D. Gibson. 2020. “New Directions in Veto Bargaining: Message Legislation, Virtue Signaling, and Electoral Accountability.” In SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science & International Relations, eds. Luigi Curini and Robert J. Franzese. London: SAGE. 224-243.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Nathan D. Gibson. 2019. “Does Money Buy Congressional Love? Individual Donors and Legislative Voting.” Congress & the Presidency 46(1): 1-27.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Nathan D. Gibson. 2019. “Developments in Congressional Responsiveness to Donor Opinion.” In Can America Govern Itself?, eds. Frances E. Lee and Nolan M. McCarty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 69-92.
Projects in Progress
(working papers available upon request)
Book Project: The Policies Presidents Make: When and Why Presidents Centralize Executive Branch Policymaking
"Consequences of Presidential Centralization" (Working paper)
“The Politics of Presidential Centralization” (Working paper)
"Measuring Presidential Centralization: A View from the Executive Agencies" (Working paper)
“The Politicization of Congressional Capacity” (Working paper with Ben Hammond and Leah Rosenstiel)